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Judging works of art is one thing. Loving a work of art is something else. When 
you visit a museum like the Louvre you make hundreds of judgements in the 
space of just a couple of hours. But you may grow to love only one or a handful 
of works over the course of your entire life. Depending on the art form you are 
most aligned with, this can be a painting, a novel, a poem, a song, a work of 
architecture, or some other art object or performance. As it happens, however, 
both of us have fallen in love with a series of films: Before Sunrise, Before Sunset, 
and Before Midnight. But what does it mean to love a film? What’s the difference 
between liking a film, loving a film, and being a film lover? How rational or 
irrational is it to fall in love with a film? What are the constitutive elements of 
such a love? These are the questions we’ll aim to address in this paper.  
 
 
Truly, Madly, Deeply  
 
Most people will know what it’s like to fall madly in love with someone. You feel 
the proverbial butterflies when you catch a glimpse of your beloved in the 
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street; you think about them constantly; you become interested in everything 
about them (where they live, what they do for work, where they were born, etc.) 
and the most banal items, say, a napkin or a pen they used, suddenly acquire a 
special significance. Something very similar happens when you fall in love with 
a work of art. Each time we see the opening sequence of Before Sunrise, set 
perfectly to the music of Purcell’s Dido and Aeneas, the butterflies are there. 
We’ve caught ourselves thinking and talking about certain conversations in 
Before Sunset for days and weeks after we’ve seen the film. We confess that we 
have visited Vienna and Paris just to retrace the footsteps of the main characters 
(and film crew), and plans are underway to visit the Kardamyli residence where 
Before Midnight was shot. And, sure enough, if we could get hold of a prop that 
was used in either of these films, no matter how banal the item, it would 
become one of our most prized possessions.  
 
Naturally, a state of infatuation can be short-lived and superficial. But it need 
not be. You can grow to love a person, truly and deeply, and this often is a life-
changing experience with a lasting impact on how you think and what you 
value. The same with art: falling in love with a painting or a novel may be the 
start of a relation that lasts for decades and that changes the very fabric of your 
mental and emotional life. It should be clear that this is very different from 
merely judging a painting or novel to be successful. You can judge a novel or a 
painting to be great and yet have no love for it (Proust’s In Search of Lost Time is 
our own go-to example here). Equally, you can fall in love with a work and at 
the same time acknowledge that some other work you don’t happen to love is 
more successful as a work of art. For instance, we have no difficulty in conceding 
that the Before films are not as accomplished as, say, Mulholland Drive or Vertigo. 
But we love the former, while we only admire the latter.  
 
Falling in love with the Before films, in our case, has been the start of a long-
term relationship with real-life impact. The very fact that we are writing this 
essay and editing this book, so many years after we first saw the films, is 
testament to this. (Likewise, Jesse spending years of his life writing a novel 
about his one night with Céline indicates that it was much more than just a 
cheap fling.) But we are certainly not alone in loving these films. Over the years 
the films have acquired a score of devoted fans for whom the trilogy is 
extremely close to their heart. There is Before Sunrise fan fiction, there are 
multiple fan websites, there is a fan-made fourth instalment, entitled Before the 
End, there are artists like Rozette Rago whose work has been influenced and 
inspired by the movies (Rago 2019). Film critics have picked up on this as well.  
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Twenty-five years ago this month, a modest film was released in theaters 
across the United States, to little fanfare. Late January is traditionally a 
dumping ground for misbegotten movies and, though the film debuted to 
respectful reviews, it ended up grossing an unspectacular $5.5 million. Yet 
those few who saw Before Sunrise fell in love with it, and it eventually 
developed a passionate cult following (Luckard, 2020). 
Indeed, scholar and critic Robin Wood once admitted that Before Sunrise ‘was a 
film for which I felt not only interest or admiration but love’ (1998: 318). And as 
a critic for The Guardian wrote more recently: 
When Before Sunset was released in 2004, its co-writer and co-star Julie 
Delpy mused on the popularity of the two sublimely romantic movies she 
and Ethan Hawke had made with director Richard Linklater: "It's not like 
Star Wars, but in that small group of people, it really means something to 
them." Which is to say that, for that small group of people, among whom I 
loudly and proudly count myself, awaiting a new instalment of the Before 
trilogy (as it stands, for now) is in fact exactly like Star Wars, just without 
the lightsabers (Patterson, 2013). 
So, to many people it seems only natural to describe their attitude toward a 
particular film as an attitude of love.  
 
 
Liking, loving, judging   
 
Curiously, in both the philosophy of art and the philosophy of love, the 
phenomenon of loving an art work has been largely ignored. There are a few 
exceptions (the topic is touched upon in recent essays by Jerrold Levinson, Sam 
Shpall, and in Alexander Nehamas’s Only a Promise of Happiness). But the 
phenomenon remains severely underexplored. Before we investigate why that is, 
it’s important to draw a few distinctions – because the word ‘love’ gets thrown 
around a lot. For instance, we love Before Sunrise, but we also love a cold beer 
on a hot summer’s day. There’s a difference between these two, obviously. In the 
latter case, what we mean is simply that we like drinking chilled beer when it’s 
hot outside. A Stella would be good, but a Jupiler, Vedett, Duvel or Seefbier would 
do the trick just as well. When we profess our love for Before Sunrise however, 
we refer to something much more exclusive and much more profound and 
lasting, something that goes beyond a mere liking. As Céline herself formulates 
it in that first instalment: “if you have a meaningful experience with someone 
else, a true communication, they are with you forever in a way.” This can be true 
of an encounter with a human being just as it can happen in an encounter with 
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an art work such as a film.  
 
Loving a particular film is also different from loving film in general. A film lover, 
or cinephile, is someone who enjoys watching films and has a passionate 
interest in cinema, just as an art lover, one could say, is someone who enjoys 
engaging with art. They value art in general and make art appreciation an 
integral part of their life. There may be a few works that the art lover cherishes 
especially, but then again there may not be. Similarly, people who love 
particular works of art (or films) will often be art lovers (or cinephiles), but they 
need not be.  
 
Loving a work of art or a film should furthermore be distinguished from loving a 
fictional character. Not only because one can come to love artworks that are not 
fictional and don’t have characters (just think of music), but also because one 
can love a fictional character, or at least be infatuated with it, without loving the 
work that brought the character into being. (The immense popularity of Pride 
and Prejudice in the 1990s was in large part due to the mass-infatuation with Mr 
Darcy as played by Colin Firth in the BBC series, rather than to a genuine 
appreciation of the book as a work of literature.) Finally, to love a particular 
work of art is not the same thing as loving an artist. Of course, love for a 
painting or a film might lead to a fascination for the artist who created the work. 
But one should not be confused with the other. We love the Before trilogy, but 
we don’t love Richard Linklater.  
 
So why has the phenomenon that we’re interested in been overlooked in the 
relevant literature? We suspect that this is in large part because of certain 
prevalent (pre)conceptions about love. For instance, if you believe that love 
must be mutual in order to really qualify as love, then paintings or novels are 
immediately disqualified as love-objects. A painting or a novel will not love you 
back. Similarly, there can be no love for a work of art if you hold Kyla Ebels-
Duggan’s ‘shared-ends view’ according to which love directs us to share in each 
other’s ends (Ebels-Duggan 2008). For what would it mean for us to adopt Before 
Midnight’s ends? The movie doesn’t have ends or goals like we have. 
Alternatively, if one thinks of love as a response to the particularly human 
capacity for valuation, as David Velleman (1999) does, then only a person can be 
the proper object of love, not a work of art (or any other object for that matter).  
 
Unsurprisingly, each of these conceptions has met with sustained criticism and 
anyone who thinks there can be unrequited love or that people can love their 
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country or their pet, should be inclined to reject them. The fact that views like 
this cannot account for the love of particular art works we consider to be just 
one more nail in their coffin.  
 
But if this isn’t the right way to think about love, what is? While we won’t 
attempt to formulate a full-blown theory here, we do want to put forward the 
following substantial claim: love always involves a complex of emotions and 
dispositions held together by a deep concern for the beloved and an intrinsic 
desire for interaction with the beloved. Not only does this conception of love 
allow for unrequited love as well as a wide range of love-objects, such as 
countries, animals, football teams, and works of art (hence making it more 
plausible from a phenomenological point of view). It also acknowledges love’s 
forward-looking, open-ended character – a feature that is illustrated so well by 
the characters of the Before trilogy whose love manifests itself in a resilient and 
persistent desire for interaction with each other.  
 
The conception of love that we propose helps to highlight some of the most 
important differences between loving a work of art and making aesthetic 
judgements about works of art. To begin with, the judgement that a painting is 
skillfully executed does not necessarily presume an emotional involvement with 
the object – something that is characteristic of love. Secondly, such a judgement 
does not necessarily entail any deep concern for the work. There are probably 
tonnes of works that we have judged favourably in our lifetime and that we have 
now forgotten all about. Thirdly, even a very positive aesthetic judgement does 
not necessarily come with a desire to further interact with the object. You can 
acknowledge that a vase is beautiful and yet have no inclination to buy it or 
spend any more time looking at it. (Here we take issue with Alexander Nehamas, 
one of the few contemporary philosophers who has tried to connect love and art, 
but who does not seem to make a distinction between judging a work of art 
beautiful and loving it. For him, judging a vase or a painting to be beautiful is 
identical with the spark of desire, the wish to engage more with the object. We 
believe this is much more typical of love and that, in fact, most judgements are 
not forward looking, but – like verdicts – backward looking.)  
 
Moreover, when we make an aesthetic judgement about a work of art there is, at 
least according to many philosophers, a rational expectation that others will (on 
the whole) agree with us. Famously, Immanuel Kant held that a judgement of 
beauty demands agreement – a claim which has been interpreted by some as an 
ideal prediction: someone who judges an object to be beautiful is claiming that 
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under ideal circumstances everyone will share her pleasure. When we love a 
work of art, by contrast, there is no rational expectation that others will share 
our love, just like there is no such expectation when we love a person.  
 
For people who love the trilogy it usually comes as a pleasant surprise when 
they do stumble upon someone who is equally enamoured with those films – 
the surprise indicating that there was no real expectation that this would 
happen. Contrariwise, devoted fans might not entirely welcome it if, through 
some strange twist of fate, the film series were to suddenly become the most 
popular franchise in the world and everyone were to fall in love with it. It might 
not be welcomed because their own special relationship with the films will 
threaten to become less special as a result. (Likewise, it would perhaps not be 
ideal if everyone were to fall in love with the person you happen to love.) Again, 
this points to a fundamental difference between loving and judging works of art: 
the desired outcome of one’s aesthetic judgement – universal agreement – will 
likely be perceived as detrimental for one’s love.  
 
 
Rationality, Irrationality, Contingency  
  
If, when we love a work of art, there is no rational expectation that others will 
share our love, does that mean that love is a-rational? Does it follow that our 
love for a work of art is not based on any reasons? Well, no. As rationalists about 
love in general, we also think that the love for a work of art will typically be 
based on (and hence justified by) reasons (Schaubroeck, 2014). After all, when 
given the opportunity, people can talk endlessly about the works they love and 
will often try to make their deep involvement intelligible by citing reasons. 
Conversely, if someone could not mention a single positive reason for why she 
loves a film, but just shrugs her shoulders when asked, we might rightly doubt 
whether she truly loves it. That is not to say, of course, that when people are in 
love they always act reasonably. Love may lead to all sorts of behaviour, going 
from reasonable to stupid to downright immoral. But that doesn’t mean that the 
love itself (defined as a complex of dispositions and emotions) is not responsive 
to reasons.   
 
But, the anti-rationalist might object, if you are justified in loving the Before 
films, if your reasons for loving the trilogy really are good reasons, then aren’t 
these reasons also going to hold for everyone else? So, if it is indeed reasonable 
for you to love Before Sunrise, then isn’t everyone rationally obliged to love the 
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film? This objection only makes sense if you assume that reasons must be 
deontic (that is, demanding a particular action unless there is a countervailing 
justification) and agent-neutral (what is a reason for X will automatically also be 
a reason for Y). But why assume that? Some reasons clearly are non-deontic. 
These are reasons that invite rather than require, that justify without 
‘unjustifying’ doing something else. Such reasons, as Jonathan Dancy argues, are 
not ‘in the wrong-making business’ (Dancy, 2004). For example, Anne may have 
good reasons to get angry at Elizabeth but if her good nature prevents her from 
becoming angry, then surely she’s not in the wrong. Furthermore, there can be 
agent-relative reasons, when the reason-giving fact, or the formulation of the 
reason-giving consideration, include a reference to the particular agent the 
reason applies to (Nagel, 1986). For example, Paul may love Phil because Phil 
helped him through a difficult time and seems to understand him like no one 
else, and because Phil’s voice and demeanor has a calming effect on Paul. These 
are legitimate reasons for Paul to love Phil, but they are clearly agent-relative. 
The fact that Phil has this effect on Paul is not a reason for Jonathan or Michael 
to love Phil.  
 
Reasons for loving a particular work of art are very often agent-relative and 
almost always non-deontic. For example, one of the authors of this article has a 
longstanding love for the novella Titaantjes, written by the Dutch author Nescio. 
When he read Titaantjes for the first time he was about the same age as the 
main characters and struggling with the same issues as they are. The novella 
really spoke to him at the time and gave him the feeling of being understood. As 
he recalls it, the novella made him see how the abandonment of youthful 
ambitions is part and parcel of growing up and it did this in a way that filled him 
(and still fills him) with a benign and comforting sense of melancholy.  
 
These, we want to argue, are good reasons for Hans to love Titaantjes. Obviously 
these are agent-relative and non-deontic reasons. Someone else is not required 
to love the novella simply because it manages to make Hans feel this way. They 
may recognize the features Hans cites but not appreciate them in the same way. 
These reasons are also non-deontic in that they help to justify Hans’s love for 
the book without making it a requirement. If he comes across another story that 
fills him with a similar sense of melancholy but he does not grow to love it in 
the same way as he loves Titaantjes, that’s absolutely fine. There is nothing 
irrational about that (just as there is nothing irrational about not getting angry 
even if you have reason to).  
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It’s precisely such agent-relative and non-deontic reasons – ‘because the poem 
helped me through a difficult time’, ‘because I feel inspired every time I hear this 
song’, ‘because I am encouraged and reassured when I see this film’ – that help 
to explain and make intelligible the deep concern, the emotional attachment, 
the desire for interaction – in short: the love that we feel for those works of art 
that come to occupy a special place in one’s life. And it is precisely such reasons 
that people tend to give when they try to describe their love for the Before films.  
 
It is true that a profound connection of this sort may depend on a number of 
contingent factors – being in an emotionally vulnerable position when you first 
come across these films, sharing a predisposition for philosophical reflection 
with its makers, or having exactly the right age to be able to relate to the 
depicted events. The latter is commented on by this critic:  
The films have had an especially huge impact on those of us who were 
roughly the same age as Hawke and Delpy as each film came out. We’ve 
watched romantic, idealistic twentysomethings grow into achingly lonely 
but passionately hopeful thirtysomethings, then into comfortably married 
fortysomethings struggling to reconnect with who they used to be, amidst 
the baggage of adult life (Luckard, 2020). 
And he continues:  
Every fan of the films feels a personal connection to them. I was on a high 
school class trip to Vienna during the summer of 1994 when Before 
Sunrise was filming, though I had no idea a masterpiece was being created 
somewhere just blocks away. I was one of the fortunate few to see the 
film in theaters in 1995, simply because I happened to recognize Vienna 
in the television commercials. Hawke and Delpy were a few years older 
than me, but I could relate to everything they went through. I could see 
moments I had felt and lived. There were flashes of people I knew in 
Céline and Jesse, as well as flashes of myself, at both my best and worst 
(Luckard, 2020). 
But that such contingent factors can play a decisive role in whether or not you 
will fall in love is just a fact about love in general and one that is, for that 
matter, beautifully illustrated in the Before trilogy itself.  
 
 
The Tripartite View  
 
While we have not offered a fully developed theory of love, the substantive 
conception that we propose bears strong affinities with the full-fledged account 
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developed by Sam Shpall. For Shpall, love has a fundamental role in making our 
existence meaningful (2017: 70). Love generates meaning in our lives, as Shpall 
illustrates with various examples: a mother taking care of her disabled child, a 
pious person committing herself to God, an artist devoting his entire life to 
writing a book. As the last example shows, and as we’ve indicated earlier, Shpall 
is one of the very few philosophers who makes room for love of art (2017; 2018). 
Looking more closely at his account may help to shed light on our love for the 
Before trilogy. But, as will become clear, looking carefully at the Before trilogy 
may also help us to point out a potential weakness of Shpall’s theory. 
 
Adopting a functionalist approach, Shpall takes it as a requirement for a 
definition of love that it can explain the role that love plays in our lives. The 
central argument for his preferred view of love is that it can explain love’s role 
as a generator of meaning. As the examples of the mother, the pious person and 
the artist are designed to illustrate, experiences of meaning in life have three 
features in common: the source of meaning gives structure to the lover’s life, it 
makes them susceptible to rich emotions, and susceptible to pleasing states of 
affection. This is captured by Shpall’s so-called tripartite view: [l]ove is devotion 
that renders vulnerable and expresses liking (2018: 91). In structuring our lives, 
connecting us to a source of enjoyment, and making us vulnerable, love 
generates meaning. This view appears well equipped to explain certain features 
of love as they are represented in the Before-movies and manifested in our 
particular attachment to the films.  
 
Before considering the vulnerability and devotion that comes with love, let us 
say something about the ‘liking’ that is entailed by love, according to Shpall. As 
he points out, there is something unsettling and incongruous about someone 
who claims to love a person, but does not in any way enjoy their company and is 
only negatively affected when thinking of them. Loving and liking go together, 
as is also evident in the Before trilogy. Céline and Jesse clearly enjoy each other’s 
company. They instantly take to one another in Before Sunrise, they cannot tear 
themselves away from each other in Before Sunset, and even in Before Midnight, 
where their love is put to the test, they are drawn to each other in moments of 
flirtatious intimacy and sparkling conversation.  
 
As Shpall goes on to explain, it is this aspect of liking that gives love the 
reputation of being not under our control. For our likes and dislikes are deeply 
contingent. They are not the outcomes of decisions or other volitional acts. 
Céline and Jesse cannot help liking each other, and there doesn’t seem to be an 
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act of will involved in this element of their love. Likewise, we’ve taken to the 
Before movies without this being the result of a careful deliberation on our part. 
They struck a chord with us and the enjoyment we take in watching these films 
has not left us since. At the same time, we acknowledge that other people may 
not like – or may even actively dislike - the films and that there may not be 
much that can be done about that. For those people the possibility of coming to 
love the trilogy will be very remote indeed.  
 
Loving and liking, while clearly linked, are also distinct. As we have argued in a 
previous section, love is more than a mere liking. There are people we like but 
do not love. Similarly, there are films that we enjoy watching, but are not deeply 
attached to. And if Céline had not followed Jesse off the train in Vienna, their 
mutual liking would not have been able to develop into something more. 
According to Shpall, the something more that is required for love is devotion. He 
defines devotion as being concerned about something and being disposed to act 
on this concern. There are three forms that devotion can take: concern for the 
well-being of the beloved, concern for being with the beloved, and concern for 
the satisfaction of the other’s ends. Sometimes one form of concern is 
predominant in love. Other times love incorporates all three concerns. We see 
this on display, for instance, in Before Sunset. Céline and Jesse do not just make 
polite enquiries about each other’s wellbeing, but when they sense distress and 
unhappiness they try to console the other person. As the minutes tick away, they 
make it clear – both explicitly and implicitly – that they want to continue to 
spend time together. And they show a concern for the satisfaction of the other’s 
ends: Céline is happy with the success of Jesse’s book and writing career, while 
Jesse is thrilled to hear about Céline’s job and the way that she is helping to 
make the world a better place.  
 
Two brief asides here. First, when the object of love is inanimate, like a work of 
art, it is still apt to speak of devotion, Shpall thinks, but this evidently cannot 
show in a concern for the satisfaction of the beloved’s ends (as a work of art has 
no ends). In such a case, devotion will manifest itself, for example, in the desire 
to be with the work of art and to devote time to it. Second, devotion by itself is 
not sufficient for love. This is illustrated quite aptly by Jesse’s story of marriage. 
As he recounts, he saw marriage as the moral or adult thing to do. “In the 
moment, I remember thinking it didn't much matter, the who of it all. I mean, 
that nobody is gonna be everything to you and that it's just the action of 
committing yourself, you know, meeting your responsibilities, that matters.” But 
simply committing oneself is not enough for love, as he was bound to find out. 
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“There is no joy or laughter in my home,” he complains. Husband and wife don’t 
seem to like each other very much anymore. Instead, Jesse says he feels like he’s 
running a nursery with somebody he used to date. 
 
A third aspect of love, as conceived by Shpall, is vulnerability. Unlike devoting 
oneself to someone, there is a strong element of passivity here. In the case of 
love to be vulnerable means to be affected by what happens to the beloved and 
by what the beloved does. Consequently, a lover’s vulnerability will manifest 
itself as a disposition to feel very strong emotions, like joy, pride, shame, anger, 
or sadness. There is in fact a broad consensus among philosophers of emotion 
that all emotions are concern-based. For example, it is only because I care about 
my garden that I fear its fate in the coming storm. And, conversely, all concerns 
imply investment and identification such that one becomes vulnerable to events 
that are not under one’s control. So the aspects of devotion and vulnerability in 
love are essentially linked. When Hank says, at the airport in the opening scene 
of Before Midnight, that he does not want his father to attend his recital, Jesse 
feels hurt. Or to take another obvious example of a lover’s vulnerability: when 
Jesse arrives in Vienna on December 16 to find out that Céline is not there, his 
disappointment is immense (so he eventually reveals to Céline in Before Sunset). 
When one comes to truly love a film, that, too, can engender a sense of 
vulnerability and leave one open to feeling strong emotions. If, for instance, your 
beloved film is ridiculed in conversation, that will likely be experienced as 
hurtful. Or when a further instalment in the series is announced, that can be a 
source of joy and happiness. But equally, it can be a source of genuine anxiety 
(will this next instalment do justice to the characters? Will it not destroy the 
magic of the previous films? Etc.).  
 
 
Devotion, Mourning, Interaction  
 
According to Shpall, love is devotion that renders vulnerable and expresses 
liking. One advantage of his account is that it may help to dissolve conflicting 
intuitions about the amount of control that people have over their loves. Some 
see it as “not a decision but a destiny” (Scruton cited in Shpall, 2018: 118), 
others see it as “an emotion of choice” (Solomon cited in Shpall, 2018: 118). 
Some hold us responsible for love, others think it befalls us. Here is the solution 
that the tripartite view offers: “Our intuitions are muddled because love is a 
composite psychological condition, whose component parts are very differently 
susceptible to control, and very differently amenable to normative assessment” 
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(Shpall, 2018: 119). Our likings are hard to control or manipulate. The same 
might be said about our vulnerabilities (at least once we have them). But what 
we devote ourselves to is a matter of choice. Thus offering a tripartite account 
of love allows Shpall to “grant that there is some sense of love that is not 
active” (2018: 108) while holding on to the idea that love is partly shaped by 
active choices we make concerning whom we want to spend time with, etc. The 
romance at the heart of the Before films beautifully illustrates this mixture of 
active commitment, irrepressible attraction and inevitable vulnerability.  
 
Emotions run quite high in the second half of Before Sunset but we are not 
witnessing two human beings who are merely left at the mercy of their 
emotions. They also make important decisions as they go along. They gradually 
come to endorse some of their feelings (as they perhaps come to reject other 
feelings such as guilt and anger). And they decide to act in a certain way that 
unequivocally expresses their concern for the other person. It’s worth noting 
that there were also significant decisions and actions preceding their 
reencounter: Jesse writing his book, Céline deciding to come to the book 
presentation. And as the day progresses, they shift more and more towards a 
mutual commitment that is bound to have a great impact on both their lives. In 
Before Midnight, by contrast, we may observe a shift in the opposite direction. 
Devotion seems to crumble and doubts emerge about their commitment to each 
other. They can still take pleasure in conversation and there is no shortage of 
vulnerability, as the hurt, anger but also occasional tenderness show. But the 
question is whether they are still devoted to one another. Aligning their goals in 
life, it becomes apparent, will require more than a time machine game and a hot 
night in a hotel room. (Precisely because their sense of commitment, i.e. the 
‘controllable’ part of love, is under threat, the hope remains that their love will 
survive and we are left with an open ending. They are still able to enjoy each 
other’s company, so if they don’t give up, if they persevere and make an effort, 
we are led to believe that their love may perhaps be healed and renewed.) 
 
As you may recall, in the formulation of our own view of love, we emphasized 
the desire for interaction, rather than the notion of devotion. The latter, 
according to Shpall, can manifest itself as a concern to be with someone, but it 
doesn’t need to manifest itself that way. There can be devotion that takes the 
form of a concern for the wellbeing of the other person or a concern for the 
satisfaction of their ends. Now, for all its explanatory power, it is here that a 
weakness in Shpall’s theory may become evident. Shpall seems to inherit the 
criticism that has been addressed to Frankfurt’s robust-concern view (to which 
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the tripartite view is indebted). Frankfurt defines love as robust concern, 
requiring no interaction whatsoever. Though the inclusivity of this conception of 
love is an appealing feature, the equation of love with a private state of concern 
might actually make it over-inclusive. The robust concern of a stalker who 
(falsely or rightly) believes he knows what is good for his object of devotion 
would count as love on this conception. Or, to make the same point with a less 
extreme example, Frankfurt does not see anything defective in a paternalistic 
concern that projects needs and interests on a beloved that the beloved does 
not have or that the beloved does not want the lover to interfere with (several 
people have formulated this criticism, amongst others Ebels-Duggan, 2008).  
 
Shpall’s understanding of ‘devotion’ is more flexible and versatile than 
Frankfurt’s robust concern, but still, it does not seem to require an active 
soliciting of input by the beloved and it does not seem at odds with a stalker’s 
troubling concern-at-a-distance. Adding interaction to the equation can help to 
circumvent some of these problems. Moreover, it can help to account for an 
aspect of love that the tripartite view cannot explain. On Shpall’s view it is 
puzzling why someone would mourn after an unsolicited break-up with a 
romantic partner. After all, this person can still devote his or her life to the ex-
partner, be concerned about his or her wellbeing, continue to be vulnerable and 
to like this person. Nevertheless, a response of mourning would be entirely 
understandable. Our view that places emphasis on interaction can account for 
this: although devotion, vulnerability and liking from a distance in such a 
situation are possible, the interaction will be gone, and that both explains and 
warrants the reaction of mourning, and the sense that something meaningful in 
one’s life has gone. What Céline and Jesse missed out on, after their failed 
reunion on December 16, is ongoing interaction with each other. And with this a 
source of meaning in their lives went missing. They both go through a very 
tough time after Before Sunrise and it seems fitting to say that they experienced 
some form of mourning.  
 
The notion of ‘mourning’ is at the centre of Tony Milligan’s view of love that is 
closely aligned with both Shpall’s and our own view. All three connect love’s 
value with its being a source of meaning. Hence when that source dries up or 
disappears, it is natural to feel sad. Milligan delineates the objects of love as 
those objects whose loss can be cause for mourning and grief. “We can love 
anything that we can grieve over,” Milligan suggests (2011: 7). This approach 
allows for a wide scope. We can grieve over the loss of a person. But not just 
persons. Forests, familiar places, animals etc… clearly can be objects of love 
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(Milligan, 2011:123; 128). To the list of natural environments and non-human 
animals we could (and should) add works of art. If a painting or a sculpture or a 
work of architecture that one truly loves is subsequently destroyed, the natural 
response will be to mourn the loss. Just think of the outpouring of grief after the 
2019 fire in the Notre Dame (which is curiously foreshadowed in Before Sunset). 
With the advent of digital times, it is perhaps harder to imagine the loss of a 
film. But if, say, all copies of the Before trilogy were to be destroyed or made 
inaccessible by some sort of superbug, this would no doubt cause distress to 
those who love the trilogy and leave a hole in their hearts. The film critic Derek 
Malcolm once defined a great movie as any movie he could not bear the thought 
of never seeing again. We agree with Malcolm, be it with a small amendment: it 
may not be true of all movies one acknowledges to be great, but it is true of all 
movies that one comes to love deeply.  
 
We have described our love for the Before films in terms of a desire for 
interaction with them. Shpall may prefer to speak of a concern ‘to be with’ the 
work of art that one loves. But while he might mean the same as we do, ‘being 
with’ really seems to underdescribe the relation that one seeks in regards to a 
work one loves. In loving the Before films, for instance, we want to watch and re-
watch them, discuss them, read and write about them. And, importantly, we wish 
to learn from them. We have let the films inform our thinking and doing. A self-
serving, sentimental interpretation of the movie would be the equivalent of the 
paternalistic one-sided concern that we criticized above. By contrast, the activity 
of engaging with a movie in order to understand it better and let it generate 





Robin Wood, who shared our love for Before Sunrise, described the film and the 
dynamic between its protagonists as follows:  
It is characterized by a complete openness within a closed and perfect 
classical form (…). The relationship shifts and fluctuates, every viewing 
revealing new aspects, further nuances, like turning a kaleidoscope, so 
the meaning shifts and fluctuates also. (…) [It] involves each individual 
spectator in a complex dialogue: Do you feel this, do you agree with that, 
how exactly does this affect you, your attitude to life, your ideas about 
relationships, the relationship you are in, the relationship you 
want? (1998: 324) 
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For a film to reveal new meanings, new layers and new aspects, it is necessary 
that a viewer engages with the movie and let themselves be guided by what the 
movie offers. Relationships of love are like kaleidoscopes indeed, in that they 
keep generating new perspectives on the world. This is true both of the love 
between Céline and Jesse and our love for these films. That is why we find it apt 
to characterize love in general as a practice of interaction and engagement. And 
when this practice results in a meaningful experience, a ‘true communication’, it 
is as Céline says: “it stays with you forever.” 
 
Shpall’s view and ours are in many respects closely aligned and they both leave 
room for a love that extends beyond the interpersonal realm and that can 
include the love of a film (series). The difference lies in the characterization of 
the relation between the lover and the love object. This relation, we hold, is 
marked by a desire for interaction. When this desire is frustrated and made 
impossible, grief will be a natural response. When the desire is fulfilled, the 
relation can take on certain qualities that make the love intelligible – in other 
words: it will produce non-deontic, agent-relative reasons. In this way 
characterizing love as an interaction helps to explain how the attitude of love is 
grounded in reasons that are themselves generated by qualities of the 
relationship. Like people, art works have the power to comfort, inspire, explain, 
offer hope and consolation. In this capacity they are capable of providing deep 
and meaningful experiences. It is these experiences, these relational features of 
a work of art, that we value and that do not only make us love it but also give us 
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